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Erschrecken Sie nicht, wenn ich von menschlicher Raumanschauung spreche. In phänomenologischer Reduktion hört die menschliche Raumanschauung natürlich auf, menschliche zu sein. 
Husserl (1973, p. 122).

Bei der Raumordnung lässt sich das freilich nur zeigen, wenn die der Konstitution entsprechende Synthese im wirklichen Erkenntnisprozess infolge besonderer Schwierigkeiten nicht so schnell und unbewusst vor sich geht, wie gewöhnlich. Das ist z.B. bei der Orientierung eines Blinden der Fall (…) . 





At the beginning I would like to arrange some terminological questions and remind four fundamental attitudes to the problem of space. I guess, only in two meanings we can talk about the true space (from the epistemological point of view) because even so-called ‘physical’ or ‘geometric space’ are only abstract models (ideal objects), and so-called ‘phenomenal space’, namely all that we receive via senses (visually, audibly, tactilely etc.) and a sphere of our imagination, despite of their quasi-spatial features and their structures, are only so-called ‘manifolds’​[2]​. I am sure it shall be not mine only opinion that only the sphere wherein there are possible a movement and exchange of places between some objects we could in principle call space. Physical-geometric models are abstract objects​[3]​ and phenomenal or imaginative manifolds do not have three-dimensional structures, they are, so to speak, “flat”.   
	Attitudes to the problem of an ontic status of space can be divided similarly to the division of positions with respect to universals, namely we can talk about theoretic-spatial: radical realism (Platonism), moderate realism, conceptualism and nominalism. Radical realists say that space exists independently from existence of physical objects in it and their movements in it, and is some kind of super-container. Moderate realists maintain that existence and structure of space are determined by physical objects; space is a system of places possessed or possible to be possessed by the objects; space is a system of relationships between the objects and it exists as ens rationis cum fundamentum in re. Conceptualists say that space exists only in human mind (or as a construct of human mind), nominalists say that there is no such thing like space, we just use the word space (as some kind of shortly speaking) to describe some relations between real things.
 
Names of Edmund Husserl’s (1859-1938) and Rudolf Carnap’s (1891-1970) are not compiled by any kind of handbooks of history of modern philosophy. Husserl, as we know, is the founder of transcendental phenomenology and the phenomenological school in XX century, he begins a style of philosophizing typified by complicated methodology and terminology.  Carnap is a co-founder and member of the Vienna Circle, logical positivism, philosophical trend wanting in 20s and 30s of XX century to build a new philosophy upon physics as primary science and physical jargon as a fundamental language in science. Carnap and other logical empiricists were world-famous for their metaphysics criticism, saying that metaphysical theses are senseless. Hence Husserl is in short (in popular philosophical literature): a maximalist and metaphysician, and Carnap – a minimalist, analyst and anti-metaphysician. Was there anything connecting them both?	
The early (1928) and well-known Carnap’s work called The Logical Building of the World (Der Logische Aufbau der Welt)​[4]​ includes already the explicit connections with Husserl and his student O. Becker especially in the theory of space​[5]​. A similar situation is with Carnap’s dissertation on space and his some manuscripts from early 20s before the Aufbau, about which I shall talk later. We must not pass the fact from the same early 20s when Husserl as a world-famous philosopher gave his lectures and seminars in Freiburg and Carnap (as a Ph.D.) attends them (he is on the list of members of Husserl’s seminars). 
Having those above mentioned proofs we can note in the same time – after a reading of other works of Carnap and his followers – that this surprising connection between a thought of the founder of phenomenology and early conceptions of the logical empiricist​[6]​ has been completely concealed. You do not find any mention about it in Carnap’s intellectual autobiography​[7]​. The author of the Aufbau for over 30 years did not agree for its translation into English after his coming to the United States in 1935 where his Aufbau was being read as enthusiastically as Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. The English translator of the Aufbau, Rolph George (not knowing about connections between Carnap and Husserl) in his email to me confirmed that the English version of the book had been thoroughly terminologically rearranged to give it a more modern sound​[8]​ accordingly to Nelson Goodman’s early philosophy​[9]​. The connections interesting to us were not known even to specialists of early Carnap works​[10]​. It seems comparing him with the founder of phenomenological school even nowadays sounds really exotic or funny​[11]​. One could say that Husserl rather could have learned something from Carnap than vice versa. 

1. Introduction to Husserlian phenomenology of space.
According to Husserl’s thought we should remember that 1) there are three groups of philosophers referring to it​[12]​ that gave their own interpretations of it; 2) there are commentators of it that explain it from, so to speak, evolutionary point of view, namely regarding the changes of phenomenology in (late) Husserl and his students works; 3) there are some self-critical opinions of the author of Ideas formulated by him in 30s and those opinions are interpreted in different ways as well; 4) there are still published Husserlian Forschungsmanuskripten that provoke to new interpretations and commentaries; 5) even Husserl himself did not concern his phenomenology as a philosophical system but rather as a researching science, as a discipline concerning concrete philosophical researches. Knowing that I am conscious that my interpretation of Husserl might be criticized.
I shall try to show now the most important elements of transcendental phenomenology of space, assuming that the Reader has general knowledge of phenomenological procedures and peculiar character of attitude elaborated by the author of the Cartesian Meditations​[13]​. 
Husserl claims that we perceive space in two aspects: 1) space is co-seen (mitgesehen) by us with spatial things, and 2) space is co-seen as so-called the Relief (so to speak, the multi-shape of things)​[14]​. In that case, if we liked to say anything about the phenomenon of space, we should scrutinize first a phenomenon of spatiality of things perceived by us. The author of the Logische Untersuchungen having executed so-called ‘transcendental epoché’ starts extraordinarily subtle geometrizing analyses of perception (from a completely still, motionless perception to a perception when we move around perceived object). 
Knowing that issue of the epoché is the subject of much controversy in philosophical literature I would like to pay our attention to it but only with respect to the phenomenology of space. The transcendental reduction used in phenomenology of space allows Husserl to: 1) focus only on the process and structure of visual perception​[15]​, 2) observe the progressive manifesting of a corporality (Leib) of a subject during the processes of perception of what spatial is​[16]​, and then 3) regard so-called kinesthesia that means an interwining each other all the corporal sensings​[17]​. Having scrutinized that Husserl points to 4) an active role of a subject of perception, namely that one who moves his perceptual organs (‘eyes’, ‘hands’ etc.) and that one who makes his whole body move and to 5) space as an 5a) area affording possibilities for occurring of perception​[18]​, 5b) area of movement of objects of perception, 5c) area of movement of corporal subject of perception.
Husserl’s view in our subject matter we could formulate the following: epistemology of space before ontology of space. However, I would like to add another general remark with respect to essence of transcendental phenomenology and especially to Husserlian epoché.  If I had to formulate it shortly I would say: epistemology before anthropology​[19]​. Theory of cognition, of perception and of knowledge before any philosophy of human (resp. first we should analyze phenomenon of cognition and after that we can build any philosophy of human). If we think deeply enough into it, we shall comprehend an accurate sense of transcendental phenomenology, I believe.
	We have to emphasize that Husserl do not attempt to reconstruct our ‘primary joint or contact with space’​[20]​. He is not interested in solving the problem of ‘how it happened that we started seeing spatially’. He scrutinizes a phenomenon of our spatial perceiving. The phenomenological questions he poses are: what does the spatiality of our perceiving consist in?, how can we describe it?, how does the space constitute within our perceptions?, and how do we reach our apprehension of the space? The epoché used by Husserl in theory of space do not break off our bonds with the real world (as many of critics of the phenomenological approach assert) but only changes our previous attitude to our perceptions. After the epoché we observe e.g. our visual perceptions – using ‘ultra-cognitive’​[21]​ attitude – wanting to apprehend the appearing of space in them, or more strictly, appearing spatial structures in them (hence Husserlian researches of phenomenon of space start from those one that focus on phenomenon of spatial thing; we do not see space itself, it is co-seen by us, as I said earlier, at the same time with the things places in it).
To his description of the process of the ‘opening before us’ of space the author of Ideas submits using phenomenologically interpreted geometry (or, more strictly, topology​[22]​, for metric features of objects perceived by us are not in case). It allows Husserl during his analyzing of our experiencing the world to extract a stratum that is strictly spatial (atemporal and non-causal). He proposes here to use some kind of a visual isolation that consists in a ‘stopping’ all the processes of visual perception to start scrutinizing a correlation between a one-sidedly given appearance of an object and its (that appearance’s) way of intentional apprehending​[23]​.
It is worth noting that so-called ‘eidetic analysis’ of the essence of a solid (Körper, a spatial thing) in visual perception, in Husserl’s opinion, points to necessary (in perceptual apprehending of a given object) kinetic participation of mobile corporality of a subject. The essence of a solid delimits a spectrum of moves that must be made by a subject if he is supposed to see a whole given object optimally. Those moves in turn can be actualized only within some space that surrounds and includes the object (solid).  
In the way mentioned above, namely in the reciprocal appearance-comprehension correlation: a spatial thing (seen at first when perception is stopped, stable) – a spatial subject (stable at first, then starting to move around the spatial thing) intentionally constitutes three-dimensional space​[24]​ wherein our visual perception takes place. However, if we wanted to talk about the intersubjective space (not only the ‘oriented’ one, mine) we have to get in touch with other subjects and together with them we should objectivize the structures of our subjective spaces. The correlate of the procedure of that kind of co-objectivization (transcendental transformation), maintains Husserl, is real, objective space (which on the level of individual, monosubjective perception is only ‘conjectured’ but can be categorially intuited).  
We have to explicitly state with respect to used by the author of Formal and Transcendental Logic the procedure of geometrization of perception that geometry is taken here in a different way than in “classic” that means pre-reductionally understood formal theory of space. Husserl matches geometric concepts with the pure phenomenological sense and to tools taken from geometry he gives the pure phenomenological intra-descriptive use​[25]​. Hence he treats the concepts and tools operationally (from the epistemological point of view) and not objectively. 
The founder of transcendental phenomenology conceives the constitution of space both in static and dynamic, monosubjective and intersubjective aspects. Objective space (co-seen by us with the things) constitutes gradually on the way of presenting themselves of the layers of spatiality and within the wider and wider areas of our perception (to begin with stationary perceiving and finishing with perceiving of moving, corporal subject) and on the way of intersubjective (common) objectivization of systems of places, the systems that (eventually or potentially, it depends on that if subject moves and in which area he does so) belong to different transcendental subjects. A dynamic aspect of such conceived constitution is the movement phenomenon (that of objects of perception or of subject himself) and all the sphere of the kinesthetic sensations connected with movement. Those sensations have strictly, says Husserl, connection with the constitution of the corporality of the transcendental subject (and of spatiality as such, of course). It is interesting that the movement has also its quasi-spatial counterpart on the side of subject’s intentionality, for on the way of the wider and wider intentional transformations​[26]​ we reach a full view on three-dimensional space. The view, the look is possible thanks to presenting of spatial things and the ‘transparency’ of the vision space (space of sight) attendant upon our acts of perception.
 
Husserl conceives the constitution of space as the monosubjective intentional transformation of manifold of so-called sensuous fields that we make during our corporal-moving activity (objective space is the correlate of the monosubjective transformation). On the other side​[27]​ he conceives it as intersubjective, intentional transformation of structures of subjective perceived spaces that we make (together with so-called ‘transcendental empathy’) within our community of transcendental subjects that communicate each other (hence, the objective space is the correlate of the intersubjective transformation). The ‘physical space’, in Husserl’s opinion, is only an intersubjective construct.
Summarizing we can say that Husserlian conception is realistic (at least at the starting point) and moderate deterministic​[28]​ (to the moment of writing Ideas I and II, wherein Husserl starts reformulating his theory of space into the transcendental idealism).

2. Carnap’s attitudes to space (from the Raum to Aufbau-1)
2.1 The Raum
	For the first time the question of space Carnap analyses in his dissertation​[29]​, making an attempt at an ordering the problems connected with the issue on a certain meta-theoretic ground​[30]​. In his opinion previous discussions on space​[31]​ are the effect of mixing different methodological attitudes, and the main reason of it is an inappropriate use of a term ‘space’ when speaking of different designates. First we should distinguish different spaces and then against the background of such discrimination we should establish some relations between them and relations between sciences concerning those spaces as well, or strictly, between sentences of these sciences​[32]​.  
It is also necessary to comprehend, so to speak, a genesis of different spaces, i.e. we have to know in the frameworks of which procedures of our cognition we gain a grasping or constructing of such and such space. In this place Carnap tries to overcome an aporetic (in his opinion) Kant’s conception by means of those borrowed from Husserl​[33]​, since he maintains that we cognize different spaces in different ways. Namely, so-called the Anschauungsraum​[34]​ is apprehended by us in a different manner than the physical space. It is a result of our eidetic intuition or insight (Wesenserschauung) into the essence of space. It is also the topological space. The insight mentioned above we gain (as we can think) changing eideticly the structure of space given in our sensual experience​[35]​. 
 The apriori character of the Anschauungsraum constists not in that it is an intra-subject form of possibility of any outer experience (in Kantian sense), but in that its structural analysis allows us to fix objective conditions of experiencing whatever. The space is apriori with respect to metric space as well, and the latter, in Carnap’s opinion, is strictly conventional. The physical space in turn is cognizable empirically and after our setting a metric to it that space can be assumed as the metric one​[36]​. On the other hand the formal space, as subject of science and as the most general structure can be deduced from logical grounds, it is analytic one, so all the statements of pure geometry can be acknowledged as apriori judgments​[37]​. There exist two geometries: analytic and physical (empirical) ones​[38]​. The spaces distinguished by Carnap, i.e. the formal, Anschauungsraum and physical ones are researched by Husserlian formal ontology, regional ontology​[39]​ and natural sciences. 
No doubt that the prospecting logical empiricist modifies in a way the phenomenological understanding of the essence of space​[40]​. In accordance with Husserl’s conception the Wesen  is an ideal object that is quality-free, timeless, existing independently from subjects of cognition and delimiting the spectrum of possibilities of coming out of its particular, so to speak, exemplifications (i.e. objects that fall under the pure essence). Meanwhile the author of the Aufbau even if he interprets the essence of space as some kind of the ‘ideal form’ (as an idea), he places its existence inside… the mind of a subject of cognition. Simultaneously he asserts that our intuition of the essence of space we attain by means of the eidetic analysis of the contents of our outer experience​[41]​, having discovered some figural regularities in it​[42]​. On the contrary to Husserl (and referring to D. Hilbert​[43]​) he claims that the eidetic insight has a spatial component​[44]​ and hence we can talk here about a certain spatial apriori that affords us possibilities to connecting the pure logical structure of space in geometric sense with our experiencing of spatial relations in the physical world​[45]​.
Kant was wrong, concludes Carnap, when identifying the perceived space (here the Anschauungsraum) with the Euclidean manifold. The conceptions of asserting that the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries disproves Kantian’s conception of apriori, were wrong as well. We are able to find another solution of the problem: the most general, eidetic form of space is topological​[46]​ and also superior with respect to any metric spaces (even Eclidean or non-Euclidean ones), and it determines the condition of experiencing of things of the real world. 
Unfortunately, the problems sketched above are not widely epistemologically analyzed in the Raum ​[47]​. Just after the publication of his dissertation (1922) Carnap starts working on new theoretic-spatial researches. Most of them will be included after some modifications in the Aufbau-1 in 1928 and some of them will not be published a very long time. 

2.2 Works after the Raum
Other Carnap’s writings published in 20s before his joining the Vienna Circle refer to the contemporary discussions about philosophical grounds of Einstein’s theory and the problem of structure of the physical space (after the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries)​[48]​. In his articles after the Raum we can find two mentioned earlier ways of investigations: 1) working on philosophical grounds of physics and 2) attempts of working out a new, formal (in a special way) epistemology. 
His initial researches​[49]​ (since 1922) tend to logistic​[50]​ and topological comprehending of epistemologico-ontological problems​[51]​. Their point of departure is a peculiar, function-relational​[52]​ conception of cognition as well with a conception of constituting of knowledge. In the Quasizerlegung…​[53]​ Carnap elaborates his own conception of so-called quasi-analysis that consists in formal transformation of a certain relationally grasped object domain into a grasping that regards a characterization of elements being members of the relations. In his Topology of the Spatio-Temporal World ​[54]​ (which I omit here) he tends to an axiomatic formulation of the Minkowski-Einstein theory by means of certain logico-topological tools.
The most interesting work from the epistemological point of view is an unpublished manuscript being a prototype of the Aufbau​[55]​, under the working but bombastic title From Chaos to the World of Experience​[56]​. Carnap uses here his quasi-analysis. The beginning of the text is something like Heraklitean visionary. We can read there about the ‘chaos’ as something source and primary in relation to our all scientific conceptualizations. However, the author simultaneously claims that he tends to arrange the Wirklichkeit in a new way, especially to arrange our knowledge about the world​[57]​. 
The ‘chaos’ (treated here as a certain theoretical fiction​[58]​) is confronted with the sphere of our experiences (Erlebnissen) from which we can contructionally reveal ‘objective realms of reality’ and ‘psychic realms’ as ‘my soul’ (Seele), ‘consciousness’ and ‘subconsciousness’. In other words, as a point of departure we should assume a certain radically reduced sphere of experiences, from which we should trace a certain minimum of our knowledge about the world. Speaking of the ‘constitution of the world of experience’​[59]​ (within our theory of knowledge) we have to begin with a certain primary level not assigning anything to the ‘chaos’ (i.e. an unformed content of our experience) nor to the sphere of our Erlebnissen​[60]​.  We should not also say anything about neither ‘sense qualities’ nor even assume the difference between the physical and the psychic. The definitive level out of which we need to start constructing the knowledge about the world are our ‘experiences of living now’ (Gegenwartserlebnisses)​[61]​. Within them we can draw the distinction between what the living is and the dead (lebendig-tot)​[62]​. The former Carnap calls the ‘sensation’, while the latter – the ‘representation’.
The representation can be divided into that what not remembered is and what remembered is. The remembered can be divided into a manifold of memories and relations between them. This process of analysis happens in time and already not on the level of the living now​[63]​. Then Carnap starts formalizing dependencies between those, so to speak, elements of his theory of knowledge discovered by him​[64]​. The Erlebnissen are interconnected, claims Carnap, and their contents (here also: the ‘qualities’) allow us to group them into different classes​[65]​.
The ‘quality classes’ overlap ‘sense classes’ and then thereby the ‘color classes’ and ‘hue classes’ form the ‘vision class’ (Gesichtsklasse)​[66]​. Analogically the ‘hearing class’ (Gehörklasse) is constructed out of the ‘audible qualities’ and so on. In the frameworks of the visual (Gesichtselementen) Carnap points to a peculiar regularity called by him the ‘slow change of appearance’ (Gesichtsveränderung). It points to a ‘point of view’ (Blickpunkt) and to a distribution of parts of a surface, the distribution that reveals the ‘visual field’ (Gesichtsfeld). This way we gain the primary level of our experience and here we can talk about some kind of ‘reality’​[67]​. 
	The expansion of the field of the experience reveals some ‘tendencies’​[68]​ i.e. the tendency to leveling any changes, to retaining a given state (by means of the ‘substance category’ (Substanzkategorie) and to stopping a ‘flow’ (by means of the ‘causal category’)​[69]​. This way Carnap attains the second level of his construction, claiming that, the construction of the world of experience is carried on by means of the Gesichtselementen because they can help us gain the ‘three-dimensional’ area wherein we can find some ‘solids’ (Körpers) (mobile/immobile, changing/unchanging in time). To the surfaces of the solids are assigned the elements of the ground level and to each ‘visual field’ is assigned a peculiar ‘bundle of beams’ (Strahlenbüschen) which ‘focus’ is located in the center of a certain solid called my corporality (mein Leib) ​[70]​. 
	The main areas of the experience are divided into the ‘quality classes’ and ‘sense classes’, out of which we can infer (on the ground of their arrangement) the most important classes: of seeing and of hearing. Others are inferred in the following manner: a certain ‘visual solid’ (Sehkörper) and a subclass of a certain sense class, i.e. the ‘tactile class’ and they both have the following feature: the mL-solid does not disappear from the ‘area’ of the experienced world.  
	The ‘quality classes’ (within the tactile class) can be assigned to some parts of the surface of the mL-solid. Analyses on the level reveal other classes, such as: the ‘pressure class’ (Druchklasse), the ‘movement class’ (Bewegungsklasse), the ‘intra-corporal tension class’ (Spannungsklasse) and the ‘kinesthetic sensations’ (Kinäesthetische​[71]​ Empfindungen). Step by step there is revealed the whole structure of a subject which, I guess, we gain after forming itself the sensory-corporal sphere.
	Among the solids surrounding mL, continues Carnap, we can distinguish (on the ground of their similarity to mL) other solids (andre Leiber) that we can name ‘living’ (beseelt) for the sake of their causal inter-relation and especially the ‘sign-expressional’ relations. However, Carnap tends not to the intersubjective reality but to the field of physics. In his conception the sphere of experiences we can connect (by the means of the formal assignments) with the world of physics​[72]​, for all the spheres show the constructional features of the Wirklichkeit.
Carnap here does not concern the essence or structure of space, hence in the Chaos he leaves the researches started when writing the Raum. Perhaps the Chaos’ analyses shall make him to build the whole system of the constitution/construction​[73]​ of the conceptual scheme of science on the ground of the special (i.e. logistically, extensionally and ‘eideticly’) conceived so-called ‘elementary experience’​[74]​.

2.3 The Aufbau​[75]​
I think that in order to accurately understand of theoretic-spatial position formulated in the Aufbau we need to assume few things. First we have to assume that we do not possess either an accurate experience of space​[76]​ or an eidetic insight into the spatial structure​[77]​. If we need to describe the physical space we have to use a precise model elaborated within formal sciences​[78]​. On the other hand geometry (here a sub-discipline of the relation theory) can be constructed on the grounds of logic​[79]​ being the primary science in the science system​[80]​. Second, when scrutinizing space we are interested only in its formal features and they are modeled by geometry.     
Concerning the step from the ‘two-dimensional order of visual field’ to the ‘three-dimensional order of visual things’ (the step that is one of the most important ones within the construction of space procedure), the author of the Aufbau refers to different theoretical attitudes those of Russell’s and Husserl’s​[81]​. Conversely to the former he claims that he tends to gain the ‘whole visual world’ not a sphere of individual things and on the contrary to the latter Carnap does not assume the two-dimensional field as anything given but as something that must be introduced constructionally​[82]​.  He asserts that we cannot treat the visual space, a space location, space configurations and spatiality of things as, so to speak, primary beings, but rather as objects subject to the construction​[83]​. The system of the Aufbau grasps only the structure of space. However, adds Carnap, the space constructed in it is not an abstract space in geometric sense (i.e. geometric manifold)​[84]​.

I have mentioned before about some interpretative difficulties that we encounter when attempting to univocally designate how one could accurately understand The Logical Building of the World anyway I shall try to recreate a compact image, trying to fulfill gaps in explanations that are present in Carnap’s book. We can distinguish generally two attitudes to the problems of space: physicalistic and epistemological ones​[85]​. The former is strictly connected with the construction of the ‘all-embracing’ structure of the world​[86]​, so only the latter should be connected with the autonomous constituting of the space. The former attitude refers to the theoretic-physical procedures elaborated by A. Eddington, Weyl and H. Minkowski. The space here should be conceived as one of the parameters constituting the reference system for physical events: 1) the relation between electrons, 2) set of relations within a four-dimensional continuum, 3) set of connections between the ‘world-points’ (i.e. elements of the ‘world-lines’ in Minkowskian sense)​[87]​. Such conceived the spatial structure of the world would be, as we can think accordingly to the main thesis of the Aufbau​[88]​, the fundamental reference system for any intra-world objects or events.
However Carnap points to that he would not like to prejudice which of the above mentioned models is the most adequate to the construction of the ‘world of science’​[89]​ and focuses more on epistemologically conceived the ‘constitution of space’. It is grounded upon an epistemico-logical procedure thanks to which there are constituted different levels of the visual space. Probably for Carnap the sensual-qualitative order is primary to any ‘actualization’ or ‘material fulfillment’ of our visual experience structures. The order determines the forming of the experience and those philosophical conceptions that inferred a sphere of the sense qualities out of that what is monosubjective were wrong. Hence we should reach the structure of the experience beginning from the structure of the world and not conversely​[90]​.  
	When building the ‘science system’ we should introduce some ontological and epistemological assumptions. First of all we have to assume that the objects of science are structures, i.e. that it deals only with formal features of objects and relations between the features​[91]​. In that manner we perform the first ontological reduction wherein an object is reduced to a web of its formal features. Next procedure consists in reducing the objects of science to the ‘sense qualities’​[92]​ or in other Carnapian words, to the ‘elements of our experience’​[93]​. 
The level of those qualities we attain also by means of an epistemological reduction performed on a structure of our sensual experience. Performing the procedure we abstract from the entire ‘material contents’ of the experience, from its actual process and we have in effect an elementary form of the experience, the form that consists in a certain arrangement/configuration of ‘sense qualities’. Each of subjects of perception, Carnap maintains, has his own sequence of sensual experiences (Erlebnisstrom) and in order to reach a structural congruence with respect to the objects constructed on the grounds of those experiences, we have to refer either to formal features of the objects or to formal features of the experiences wherein the objects appear​[94]​. We assume in the same time​[95]​ that the subjects’ structures of experience are analogical i.e. that the subject S1 perceives outer objects similarly as S2 (the assumption seems to be necessary when speaking of the ‘science system’)​[96]​. 
We can illustrate it so that each of subjects {S1, S2, …, Sn} deals with a certain set of physical objects​[97]​ {o1, o2, …, on} that are seen by him every day while the sets do not have to be extensionally equal. Moreover, the sets even do not have to have their intersection. Objects seen by me in my house might be never perceived by a subject Sx. In what manner is it possible any intersubjective communication with respect to objects of the world since every one of us possesses his own ‘set’ of them? Accordingly to Carnap we are allowed to do so by the language of science. It is referred to the ‘state of affairs’ (general and special ones)​[98]​ and gives us certain indexes​[99]​ (Kennzeichen) or more strictly describes us certain conditions that must be fulfilled to such and such state of affairs may occur. Those indexes allow us accurately identify a given object, i.e. the subject knows which states of affairs are to be anticipated in case of such and such objects (e.g. how to recognize ‘rattle-snakes’​[100]​). Hence each of subjects {S1, S2, …, Sn} can observe a different rattle-snake while the structural description of the reptile (intersubjectively communicated) would be structurally consistent with the states of affairs occurring within the experiences either of S1, of S2 or Sn. Beside in the science system the construction of some new objects is founded upon a procedure of giving certain conditions of appearing of those objects, of pointing to certain possible states of affairs that should occur if a given object is to be perceived by someone​[101]​.
In case of the space theory, accordingly to Carnap, we have to construct such model​[102]​ that would 1) conceive structural features of our visual perceptions (we assume that every subjects sees the world analogically i.e. three-dimensionally​[103]​), and simultaneously, 2) correspond with the physical objective image of the world. To the above mentioned construction is necessary a ‘visual reduction’ separating the entire and rich contents of our perceptions and founded upon formal features of visual experience (the features are conceived as they were topologico-geometric)​[104]​. The procedure performed such way allows us to reduce the visual qualities to certain ‘seen points’ and to submit all the ‘visual space’ to the formal space (elaborated in geometry). 
 Similarly as in the Chaos there is in the Aufbau a radically reduced sphere of experience. However this time though his use of the visual reduction Carnap claims that he performs also the phenomenological reduction which in his opinion leads to the field of logistico-eidetic researches on the structure of the pure experience​[105]​. We have to know that this procedure is not analogical as Husserl’s (i.e. leading to revealing the layer of the ‘pure phenomena of cognition’ and to the ‘pure, absolutely existing consciousness’) but is rather a way to reconstructing the constitutive, logical structure of pure (here: elementary) experience and to the logical structure of the world, or in other words the way to the pure space.    
Carnap withholding the entire knowledge about the reality excludes also from the field of his researches the self-consciousness of a subject, asserting that its constitution is possible just after a fulfilling of certain conditions and for sure it cannot be the point of departure of the ‘science system’ that is build in the Aufbau. It allows Carnap to assume logistico-eidetic foundations and then to approach recreating/reconstructing fundamental levels of the reality and dependencies between them. Hence it allows him to perform implicitly something of the kind of the eidetic reduction affording possibilities for the insight into the essential states of affairs​[106]​. 
The reduction of the monosubjective sphere and assuming a ‘constructionist’ attitude prove that – against Carnap’s declarations - we do not deal here with the phenomenological     epoché. Since he wants his theory to be epistemologically neutral​[107]​ and refers to the conceptions that do not concern an active role of a subject in the process of perception​[108]​. „The given is subjectless”​[109]​, he claims referring to Mach, R. von Schubert-Soldern and F. Nietzsche; that means (when we construct space) we should assume that there is seeing (not I can see now)​[110]​. ‘I’ is to be constructed at the higher levels of the system.
Husserlian epoché leads to achieving the ‘ultra-cognition’, to the new conscious sight of that what occurs within e.g. our visual perception. In the Aufbau in turn we deal rather with an ‘operational’ use of another ‘ontologico-epistemological’ reduction conducted in order to build next stages of the ‘science system’, one of those is the constructed space. Carnapian epoché might be described as not the ‘stopping of the process of visual perceptions’​[111]​ but rather as a completely ‘turning off/extinguishing’ of the view, as an ‘annihilating’ of all the data as if we did not see anything​[112]​.
Obviously, in the physiological sense it is not possible (our visual field is always filled with certain ‘sense qualities’), but we can assume that we speak about an ‘empty’ or ‘potential’ visual field, namely about all that can be seen or will be seen (will be filled with our visual perceptions). Let us assume that it means the ‘area behind us’, the area behind  our back. Let us assume also that we do not have any possibility to turn back and pointing our perceptions to the area. How can we describe it (structurally and in the connection with our possible experience)? 
Not assuming at the beginning all the ‘thing-contents’ of the area we can assume only that this is a certain set of places to which we can match a certain ‘space’ that is in principle a set of points. If we assume that in the area there runs the time we can treat temporally​[113]​ (a la Minkowski) those presumed points and all of them comprehend as certain multidimensional continuum of the ‘world-points’​[114]​. 
The space has to be structured in a way, that means it must be furnished with some complex of possible qualities (e.g. ‘shapeliness of something’, ‘colorfulness’, ‘closer location’, ‘further location’ etc.) that are ready to be visually grasped. However, in order to theoretically describe the entire perceptual situation we need to have a new reduced form of language. Hence Carnap introduces next reductional procedure, so to speak, conceptually-linguistic one, since he argues that we constructionally cannot recreate the structure of our visual experience by means of the natural language or a language of any science. We reduce the sphere of our concepts and of meanings of the language of science referring to the structure and contents of our experience. It is necessary to elaborate a new language not only in terminological respect but first of all in formal one. It has to be a precise and univocal language pointing only to those cognitive situations that are (or are to be) reconstructed within the field of theory of space for example. 
	We know, Carnap says, that our natural perceiving is done spontaneously and we can only try to reconstruct its formal structure referring to e.g. the phenomenological or psychological researches. We reconstruct and not analyze a process of eventual perceiving, for accordingly to Carnap, the elementary experiences are non-analyzable and non-constructible​[115]​. Quasi-analysis of perceptual contents that are present in our visual perceptions is in the same time their ‘linguistic synthesis’​[116]​. In other words we recreate the fundamental structure of visual perception by means of geometric and linguistic models. Both of the models (beside the physical one) constitute the foundations of Carnapian theory of cognitive assignments that is meant to explain the informative side of our outer perception. 
In the Aufbau there is admitted the mathematic space i.e. the space of real numbers wherein distinguished are so-called world-points. To latter there are then assigned colors​[117]​ and then, Carnap adds, to the ‘world-points’ are assigned also the ‘quality classes’ and higher classes as e.g. ‘sense modalities’​[118]​. There is also a sequence of peculiar ‘world-points’ called here the ‘view-points’. Certain lines starting at a given ‘view-point’ constitute the ‘view-lines’​[119]​. To the ‘view-points’ are then assigned elementary experiences​[120]​ and to the ‘view-lines’ – certain ‘visual sensations’ respectively. Next a color apprehended by us within a visual sensation is assigned to a certain ‘world-point’ on a certain ‘view-line’. And in the manner mentioned above there reveal ‘color spots’ , ‘surfaces’ and at the end ‘color solids’ that are visual things (Sehdinge)​[121]​. We assume here that there exist a certain minimal changeability conditions that could occur in that visual field​[122]​ and possibility of connecting in the course of perception: that what is observed with that what is not observed by means of 1) a succeeding perceiving of a partly seen things or 2) observations of other subjects​[123]​. 
	Then, when some parameters remain still in the visual field, there starts the constitution/construction of a visual thing. We can call it the ‘solid body’ („starr”) if its metric relations remain still. The class of sensations which refer to certain seen points of the given thing is called the ‘aspect’ of the thing​[124]​. 
There also exists a certain visual solid fulfilling some conditions that allow us name it my corporality (mein Leib). Each state of the thing is close to a certain point of view. My corporality constitutes an open surface when it is seen from a certain point of view. On this level, accordingly to Carnap, we need to construct a correlation between the ‘world-lines’ of my corporality and the qualities (or ‘quality classes’) of a certain sense, because in effect of adjoining of the ‘world-lines’ of mL with 1) other part of mL or 2) a different visual thing, there constitutes a ‘tactile quality’. Simultaneously there is constructed another correlation, that of certain movements of mL with qualities of a different ‘sense class’ called the kinesthetic sense​[125]​.
	mL has other constructible features, i.e. 1) a still presence in the visual field, 2) an openness of a surface (mL is not seen wholly), 3) referring of the places on the surface of mL to the qualities grasped with the tactile sense, and 4) referring of the sense qualities received by the kinesthetic senses to the movements of mL​[126]​. My corporality hence is constructed as a thing specifically spatial for ‘tactilely-visual’ one​[127]​, Carnap concludes, adding then that just after, namely on the background of the above mentioned correlation between the sphere of qualities and the spatial sphere, we can talk about the construction of subject and so-called my consciousness​[128]​.
	The ‘tactilely-visual’ things become ‘perceptible’ ones when we assign them sense qualities. The ‘world of perception’ in turn is constructed on the ground of analogical i.e. embracing all areas of things two postulates of causality and substantiality. Using of the postulates (the same as all epistemological construction procedures) is, accordingly to Carnap, based empirically, for these postulates have been abstracted from our experience​[129]​. We can use them in the procedure of joining seen ‘color-points’ with unseen ones and ‘touched points’ with untouched ones​[130]​. The full field of our perception (‘the world of perception’) is constituted on the ground of the assignment of the sense qualities to the ‘world-points’ (e.g. we can assign a green color to the leafage seen by us).
The omitting in the Aufbau the material contents of our visual perception is supposed to allow Carnap to analyze only its formal features​[131]​. The ‘world-points’ as we know from Minkowski’s theory picture some physical events while the ‘world-lines’ picture all sequences of those events i.e. ‘the history of a given objects’. Hence we can interpret the early thought of Carnap in a new manner (different than Goodman’s). We can epistemologically assume that the Aufbau ‘world-points’ are 1) formal pictures of ‘histories’ of certain quality areas of our sensual experience and/or 2) formal pictures or ‘histories’ of certain quality qualifications of a perceived object. (Those ‘world-points’ would be assigned under some conditions to some areas of the physical world)​[132]​. 
A little enigmatic (and the same claims its discoverer from the Aufbau)​[133]​ seems to be so-called ‘physico-qualitatative’ correlation posed by Carnap as a fundamental step completing the construction of the world of physics​[134]​. It is to be consisted in that the ‘world-points’ of physics (i.e. certain events) are in one-one relation with the ‘world-points’ of the perception world.  The author of the Chaos adds that the metric of the farmer world can differ from that of the latter (the first can be non-Euclidean) hence from the side of our visual experience (i.e. from the ‘sense qualities’) there would have to be one-many relation between the sense qualities and physical magnitudes​[135]​. Unfortunately here his description of the fundamental step connecting the sphere of perception with that of events in physics’ sense finishes​[136]​. 
Carnap after all points to that the constructed full area of perception is not an important level of the ‘system of science’. The perceptual world is an occasional construct in the progress of our knowledge​[137]​ since the last level is the quality-free world of physics. Moreover, he argues, we cannot say about the objects located in the sphere of our perceptions that they are real in the same sense as the ‘reality’ is defined by science.   

3. Terminological and methodological kinships between conceptions of early Carnap and Husserl.

I think that after the sketchy compilation of the opinions of the two philosophers we can speak of certain program concurrences that shortly could be expressed such: philosophy as a strict science, neutralisticly conceived epistemology, formal ontology as a theory that gives some conceptual grounds for the system of other scientific (non-philosophical) disciplines, logic as a meta-ontology. However, there are many divergences: absolutistic-maximalistic conception of phenomenology contradicts with the minimalistic-conventionalist and methodologically dogmatic the logistic conception of the constitution/construction theory. Moreover the author of the Ideen is interested in the ‘phenomenon of the world’ while the author of the Logical Building of the World focuses on the ‘fact of science’. 
In both mentioned theories we can notice the terminological similarities (‘epoché’, Konstitution, ‘kinaesthesis’, ‘eidetic’, Körper, Erlebnisstrom, mein Leib, Retention etc.) and methodological ones (analysis of aprioric structure of experience, various reduction procedures, geometrizing analysis of perception and methododologically solipsistic perspective). At the same time Husserl and Carnap uses many different terms​[138]​ and methods and besides (in Carnap) there is a substantial modification of meanings of similarly sounding expressions (e.g. the Konstitution) and modificating of uses of certain philosophical procedures (e.g. ‘Wesensanschauung’ in the Raum, ‘phenomenological reduction’ in the Aufbau). First of all (and perhaps that is the point), Husserl treats space continually and Carnap conceives it as discrete (i.e. atomisticly)​[139]​. 
	Both of the philosophers maintain that the content of our perception is sensual qualities and at the lowest level of our perceiving of space is so-called two-dimensional visual field​[140]​. Though Husserl and Carnap disagree with the atomistic attitudes in the theory of outer perception, they many times say that the sensual stage/layer of our cognition is irreducible at all. The founder of phenomenological school considers sensual data as so-called ‘pre-objects’ and the author of The Logical Building of the World  thinks of sensual qualities as fundamental, cognitive elements of an elementary scientific experience (in Carnapian sense). Despite their considering the sense qualities as ‘abstracted’ from the contents of perceiving both of them begin with the pure sensuous sphere when describing the building of our knowledge on spatial world – in Husserl we have ‘sensuous fields’ and in Carnap ‘sense classes’ that ‘activate’ the suitable sensual modalities in a subject’s cognitive apparatus.     
	In their descriptions and explanations of our seeing the spatial they use the method of geometrization of perception (it includes even the structure or contents of acts of perceiving). Whereas Husserl uses it in a special phenomenological manner, as it was mentioned earlier the author of the Logical Syntax having assumed geometry as a theory constructible with the tools of logic, he tries to use the formal (abstract) model of space even to reconstruct the structure of our visual perception or to construct the structure of the physical space​[141]​.
	At the roots of the use of such procedure by Husserl and Carnap there is, I think, an obvious assumption that our world is three-dimensional, extending in three directions and filled with variously structured and shaped bodies. If we want to know its spatial layer we should use the theory of ‘pure spatial shapes’. However, both of them do not scrutinize in principle the seeing of depth i.e. that which way in different types of visual experiences the three-dimensionality of the world itself appears to us​[142]​. The author of the Ideas starts his researches from analyses of an isolated spatial object while the author of the Raum constructs the (empty at the beginning) ‘pure space of perception’ ex post constructing the physical space (he passes from one model to another). We do not have to add that the latter’s epistemology is anti-realistic​[143]​.
Meanwhile, I believe, at the beginning of theoretic-spatial research we should neither perform Husserlian visual isolation nor Carnapian visual reduction, but rather the ‘decentralization of our seeing’. Since our every glance is usually focused, namely it is concentrated on a certain object isolated from the surroundings then to the analysis of our visual perception we should elaborate the decentralized type of seeing wherein we apprehend only an aspect (some aspects) of the depth of all things seen at the moment. In that ‘ultra-cognitive’ look​[144]​ the solidity of physical objects is given to us simultaneously and multi-fariously; moreover it shows different features in the course of our stationary perception than when we perceive in our movement (or our being moved). The depth seen by us when we stand inside the church is ‘frozen’ or ‘ossified’ while the depths seen when we drive into the town is ‘plastic’, it is subject to the never-ending ‘metamorphoses’; the solidity of objects ‘bulges’ or ‘flattens’ (depending on our coming to them or driving away) and it also ‘opens’ and ‘bursts’ (if suddenly perpendicularly to the direction of our drive we can see a street debouching down with some new objects on the both sides of it. Certainly, the space seen that way, i.e. the ‘depth of the world’, is not a container for physical objects but rather their ‘multi-shape’ it is constituted by their structuring and their distributing (locations) – however we discover the space, it surprises us with its various formation. It is not a result of our intentional activity nor any construct within the domain of our visual perception.  

Conclusion.
The issue of meeting of those two thinkers on the theoretical ground is not so insignificant as Carnap wanted to see it after his leaving Europe and arriving to the USA. On the contrary it can be very fruitful in explaining the progress of almost whole the American philosophy of the first half of XX century​[145]​ which he was one of the most important members​[146]​. Certainly, Carnap did not follow Husserl, but something had to fascinate him since he wrote under the influence of Husserl as we saw. If somebody asked what was it? I would answer univocally: Husserlian conception of the constitution of space (and connected with it the constitution of the world), and perhaps the conception of philosophical researches introduced in the Logische Untersuchungen. 
No doubt that the author of the Raum did not carry his own researches on perception processes; the evidence to it is the sketchiness of descriptions and explanations and the lack of any neither epistemological assumptions nor examples showing different perceptual situations. In the same time, as I showed, he referred to the solutions elaborated within the phenomenology of space, to its terminology and methodology; he did so selectively and modifying it using also the tools taken from formal sciences. All of that allows us, I believe, to name Carnap’s researches to the Aufbau an attempt of logistic criticism of Husserlian phenomenology of space or his phenomenology at all​[147]​.
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2 I would suggest to distinguish the following differences: 
1)	The real space = space of the real world; space wherein we move and which is intersubjectively available for us; space around us; it is sometimes called (by naturalist philosophers) physical space, but we should remember that so-called physical space can be acknowledged only as an aspect of real space;
1)	The visual space = that one which is monosubjectively perceived by every one of us in the range delimited by our eventual somatic position and eventual set of physical objects, space around me; in other words, monosubjectively given real space;
1)	The physical „space-1” = posed by physical sciences; an abstract model of all physical phenomena;
1)	The phenomenal „space-2” (manifold-1) = monosubjective sphere of sensuous qualities accessible for us within our perceptual experience;
1)	The imaginative „space-3” (manifold -2) = mental sphere, sphere within our mind, wherein we intuit e.g. relationships between geometric objects;
1)	The „space-4” = geometric (abstract) model of space;
       7)      * the vision space = (optic) sphere of our sight.
3 Any movement is impossible here, any exchange of places as well, those objects are timeless.
4 Carnap (1928). Despite translating the Aufbau as The Logical Structure of the World (Carnap, 1967) I would suggest the above mentioned translation of the title. Furthermore in consideration of big terminological differences between the Aufbau from 1928 and that of 1967 I use the abbreviations Aufbau-1 and Aufbau-2 for the former and the latter respectively. If the differences are not so important I say simply about the Aufbau.
5 I mean the epoché (Carnap, Aufbau-1, p. 86), phenomenological terminology and especially a procedure of geometrization of perception introduced by Husserl (in his lectures from 1907 published as Husserl (1973b). An unconscious reader of the Aufbau could take the procedure as an original idea of Carnap. Husserl works were referred by his student Becker (Becker, 1923) whose paper is cited by Carnap in his theory of space. That means Carnap must have known about that kind of methodology in analyses of perception. Another problem is an issue of so-called geometry of the world used by Carnap in the Aufbau as well.
6 Carnap’s conceptions from the period the Raum - Aufbau-1 we should not treat as belonging to logical positivism. I do not agree with K. Popper and A. Ayer. In this paper I avoid discussing logical positivism and Carnap’s semantics (or his other conceptions).  
7 A lack of any Carnap’s notes on Husserl was noted by B. Uhlemann from the Carnap’s Archives in Konstanz                    (private email). R. Creath claimed that in The Collected Works to be published in the following years, there are not any notes on Husserl (private email). It is worth to add that in 1935 the founder of the phenomenological school meets the author of the Aufbau (and some other members of the Vienna Circle) after his lecture in Prague (Husserl, 1968, p. 96).
8 I do not mean unimportant changes that happen when translating any philosophical book. George with Carnap changed fundamental terms, e.g. in the English version of the Aufbau the word Konstitution (and the concept of constitution respectively) used by Carnap in his original conception was converted with the word ‘construction’ (hence with the concept of construction). 
9 I guess it is a precedent in history of philosophy when one work has two substantially different versions.
10 The philosophers surprised such connection were e.g. Creath, M. Friedman, P. Galison (private emails). Reasons to not mentioning it may be the following: 1) a general idiosyncrasy of analytic philosophers to Husserlian phenomenology, 2) the fact that the publication Husserl’s Ding und Raum (in English, of course) was in 1998 scarcely, and after reading it (if anyone wants to do so) you can find similarities between his phenomenology of space and Carnap’s early constructionism.
11 C. Glymour having fund out from me about Carnap’s attending Husserl’s seminars, answered that the former just wasted his time (private letter).
12 The groups from München, Getingen and Freiburg. Most of them are called the phenomenologists or connected with phenomenology, but it is worth to know that Husserl did not concern them as real phenomenologists at all (because of their treating of transcendental reduction).
13 Cf. Claesges (1964), Ströker (1977) and Drummond (1975).
14 Other conceptions with respect to the issue are: 1) radical realism (we perceive space), conceptualism (space is a structure within our mind or is a construct of our mind; we perceive it mentally, pure noeticly only), and nominalism (we do not perceive space, we just use the word ‘space’ to talk about some dependencies between physical objects).
15 Husserl analyzes in great detail e.g. so-called ‘visual field’, ‘visual coordinates’, ‘visual points’ and a changeability of appearing of spatial things in the visual field. He emphasizes a reversing of the appearances of things in our visual field in the course of perception. 
16 The constituting of corporality manifests on three levels. One of them is the ground of the expanding of spectrum of movements of different perceptual organs, e.g. a spectrum ‘eyes-movements’ „demands”  (because of limitations of a stable perception) an expanse for a spectrum of ‘head-movements’ as well as ‘upper-part-of-body-movements’. Any detailed description of Husserl’s phenomenology of corporality within his phenomenology of space is not an issue of my paper, however, I have to remind (writing on Carnap) that the author of the Ideas conceives subject’s corporality in the following aspects of: 1) visibility of it (it is present as a solid in the visual field), 2) being the Wahrnehmungsorgan (it helps a subject to perceive), 3) tactility and sensitivity of it (subject’s corporality has special properties: when being touched or being moved it gives to the subject peculiar sensations i.e. the ‘kinesthetic’ ones) and 4) movability of it (the subject can move his corporality using his free will).
17 I would prefer to say ‘sensings’ than ‘sensations’ when the latter have so long philosophical tradition and wide connotation. The sensings point to 1) constitutive role of subject’s corporality in perceiving spatiality and 2) the spatiality of subject’s body, for all the sensings are spatially localized, they are, so to speak, close to me, they let me talk about my corporality (mein Leib). I also prefer translating ‘mein Leib’ as ‘my corporality’ to ‘my body’ since the term ‘body’ has in English its special connotation that is far from Husserl’s phenomenological meaning. Hence I do not agree with R. Rojcewicz’s translation of Husserl’s Ding und Raum (Cf., Husserl, 1997). 
18 Widely comprehended, because our perception grasps even objects of outer space or different states of our body.
19 Husserl (1973a).
20 It is impossible to epoché to take us back „in time” to that state of our perceptual apparatus that we had at the stage of our „first encounters with space”. However, it seems that those encounters could be conceived only as “possessing the space of our body” not as “learning outer spatiality”.
21 I want to clearly distinguish ‘meta-cognition’ i.e. in the sense of a reflection attendant upon our ordinary acts of cognition (formulated e.g. in the sentence ‘I cannot clearly see that picture on the wall’) from the ‘ultra-cognition’ as the effect of the transcendental reduction. The ultra-cognition is a peculiar intellectual look at the pure phenomena of cognition (in Husserl’s sense, of course). The ‘ultra’ prefix is to be characterizing a special type of our cognition i.e. 1) as transcending the ordinary type of cognition (here extraordinarity, originality) and 2) perfection of the phenomenological look (super-cognition, the highest type of reasoning perception or intuition). Cf. Husserl (1973a).
22 Husserl (1966, p. 145).
23 Cf. Drummond (1979-80). However, on the contrary to Drummond, in my phenomenological research and interpretation of Husserl’s conception I respect the epoché.
24 In Husserl (1973b) it is called the ‘objective space’.
25 It is not an analysis of perception more geometrico. We should remember that all ‘perceptual organs’ are treated by Husserl pure phenomenologically as well. One must not understand them physiologically at all.
26 At least two of them are constitutive to the phenomenon of space. Transformation (or ‘metamorphosis’) of the first level leads to multi-sided, three-dimensional presenting itself a given spatial thing and it is the transformation of different ‘surfaces’ given apparently into a apparently-full given solid. Transformation of the second level (founded upon the first one) turns ‘shallow’ (and moving together with a subject) ‘vision/sight spaces’ into the ‘full’ ‘space of sight’ that being intentionally fulfilled structurally overlaps the perceived space. The perceived space then is the correlate of the whole kinesthetic system (at the given moment), and is perceived by every subject monosubjectively and in the same time, structural analogically, i.e. as co-seen with spatial things. 
27 I mean Husserl’s theory of space when writing the so-called Ideas I and II (at about 1912).
28 The moderate determinism of Husserl manifests in concerning a conditioning between e.g. 1) an objective placement (of a given thing) and a location of its appearance in our visual field, 2) an objective shape of a thing and its intra-perceptual quasi-figure, 3) an objective coloring of a thing and its quasi-coloring, 4) an objective temporality of a thing (persistence of it) and its quasi-temporality (persistence of its appearance or persistence of a continuum of appearances of the thing), 5) an objective spatiality of a thing and so-called quasi-rotation of its appearances in the course of moving perception (Husserl 1973b, pp. 198, 206, 215-216) and other correlations discovered by him when analyzing a phenomenon of space.
29 Carnap (1922), henceforth the Raum.
30 This arrangement is being done within an enigmatic understood the ‘theory of knowledge’. Carnap does not give any theoretical assumptions or clear criteria of his own treating of the issue. He tries to sketch some object domains and then assign them to different scientific and philosophical disciplines. However his research is not ‘methodologically neutral’ when he use methodological tools taken from different theories without checking if the tools are compatible each other even on the ground of research or its explanation.  
31 Raum, 64. He refers to B. Riemann, H.v. Helmholtz, L. Couturat and H. Poincaré. 
32 Some philosophical landmarks here are: Kantian philosophy of geometry, Husserlian early (up to his Ideen I theory of space, problem of different geometries and the problem of a structure of space itself (with respect to the discussions about Einstein’s theory).
33 Grünbaum (1963, p. 664).
34 Carnap’s use of the term ‘Anschauungsraum’ is not consistent with Husserl’s one. Husserl would say about the space of our outer perception as the Anschauungsraum (or perhaps about the „space” grasped by the acts of our imagination), but certainly he would not name the essence of space that way (the same as he would not say about the essence of color as if it were a color). It seems from Carnap’s remarks to his dissertation (Raum, 80) that he means a space “seen” by us in our geometric acts of cognition. Moreover he clearly distinguishes it from the physiologische Sehraum or space of sight, hence there is no doubt that the Anschauungsraum is meant here in a non-Husserlian way. Cf. Drummond (1984, p. 791).
35 Carnap, Raum, 63. A. Richardson maintains that it is something like a spatial formal minimum of appearing any visual experience (1997, p. 147), since Carnap (following Kant) conceives here space as a condition of possible experience adding at the same time that we have to concern which spatial relations we can reveal in every experience. We cannot use an induction here, continues Carnap, nor take into an account a quantity of experiences. So-called ‘factual content’ of our experience is always and necessarily spatially ordered but the relations within the factual material are topological only (Richardson, 1997, p. 145).
36 Carnap follows Reichenbach here (modificating Helmholtz’s and Poincaré’s conceptions of measure).
37 Carnap, Raum, p. 62.  However, not all of them, adds Carnap. The synthetic apriori judgments are possible by the means of our insight into the aprioric structure of topological space (ibid p. 63). Grünbaum (1963, pp. 664-665). 
38 This conception is characteristic to the whole thought of Carnap (1966, p. 168). Carnap (following Reichenbach) says that geometry becomes the theory of the space of physical world at the moment of fixing the rules of congruency (Schillp, 1951, pp. 50, 57). Grünbaum (1963, p. 672 (note 136) and p. 674).
39 Raum, pp. 61,65. The Anschauungsraum has some special formal features: it refers only to a delimited area (region) hence it can support (within our cognition) only spatial forms of delimited seize or magnitude (ibid p. 23). Cf. Richardson (1997, pp. 148, 154). However, in Carnap’s opinion, the Anschauungsraum is an irreducible chain between formal and physical space. 
40 It is not explicitly said if he does it himself or under the influence of B. Bauch (his promoter). 
41 Carnap, Raum, pp. 31, 61, 65. This is contradictory to Kant and neokantism too. Grünbaum says that we should connect it with Helmholtz’s conception (1963, p. 665). Cf. Richardson (1997, p. 141).
42 ibid p. 148.
43 ibid p. 154.
44 ibid.
45 Richardson says that Carnap follows Cassirer here Richardson (1997, p. 148). 
46 Grünbaum (1973, p. 152).
47 Richardson, (1997, pp.156-158).
48 Carnap (1925) and (1926). Cf. (1924a), wherein Carnap thinks of passing from the primary ’sphere of sensations’ to the secondary ’ficticious world of physics’.
49 I mean also a personal context. Admittedly Carnap after his dissertation refers to Reichenbach’s and Schlick’s works but he gets to know with them personally at the first half of 20s and then they start and criticize his works in manuscripts.
50 He refers here to Herbart-Helmholtz-Mach’s conception of a ‘formalization’ of sensations, to Natorp and Whitehead (epistemological constructionism), to Russell (epistemological logicism) and to Husserl’s phenomenology of space (especially to his geometrization of perception). 
51 Russell distinguished between three orderings of space yet in 1897. Cf. Wiener, in: . (Schillp, 1951, p. 273).
52 Cognition understood as ‘function’ was introduced by neokantians, see Kim, Paul Natorp, in: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2003 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta, <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2003/entries/natorp/> point 4.
53 Carnap (1923). Cf. Mormann (1994) and Seibt (2000). 
54 Carnap (1924b). Carnap refers to this research in his (1925, p. 345). 
55 Cf. Seibt (1997, p. 315).
56 Carnap (1922) (henceforth Chaos). When translating Wirklichkeit as „the world of experience” I follow Seibt, see her (2000, p. 178 note 5).
57 Seibt, (2000, p.  171).
58 Carnap, Chaos, p. 1.
59 The term Konstitution has been written by Carnap in blank places of his manuscript. However Carnap uses also the term Konstruktion namely in relation to the Wirklichkeit and to psychology and physics (ibid pp.12-13). I am not concerning here how those disciplines can be constructed on the ground of the monosubjective experience. The quotation marks are used by Carnap himself and may prove his meta-epistemological attitude.
60 ibid p. 1.
61 ibid p. 2
62 Cf. Carnap, Chaos, p. 3.
63 ibid p. 3.
64 All the manuscript is very sketchy.
65 The term ‘class’ seems to be exceptionally incomprehensible, since Carnap wants to describe the structure of our sensuous experience. We can treat the term operationally and even metaphorically only, for all the ‘sensuous material’ is not given to us in any ‘portions’ that could let us segregate them logistically. We cannot also conceive our cognitive apparatus as logistically ordered.  
66 Carnap, Chaos, p. 5.
67 ibid p. 7. 
68 ibid.
69 Unfortunately, Carnap do not show or explain how he discovers those categories.
70 ibid p. 8. Henceforth mL.
71 This is written by hand (ibid p. 9). Cf. note 16 in that paper.
72 Cf. Seibt, (2000, p. 170). 
73 The system of the Aufbau-1 is called the Konstitutionssystem (and the first note about the constitution of the objects of our experience (despite Erlangen conference) is in Carnap’s (1925, p.345)). His theory is called the Konstitutionstheorie. The most important procedures are ‘constitutional’ and only in the chapter on quasi-analysis Carnap introduces the term Nachkonstruktion referring to the reconstruction of the structure of the knowledge of subject. In the English version we deal with the ‘construction system’ and ‘construction theory’. It caused a certain terminological mess wherein we speak either of the ‘constitution theory’ in Carnap (e.g. A. Wiegner, Popper, V. Mayer, Seibt, Mormann) or ‘construction theory’ (C.U. Moulines). Unfortunately, it must occur in my analysis. Spiegelberg asserts that the term ‘constitution’ was taken by Husserl from neokantians (The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction Hague 1960, 214-215), hence one might say that Carnap refers to them not to the founder of phenomenology  but in §3 of the Aufbau we can find the explicit reference of the Konstitutionstheorie to Husserl’s (and Meinong’s) theory. Cf. Sokolowski (1970).
74 That way (i.e. as the elementary experience) was modified in the Aufbau-2 the original term Elementarerlebnis. Husserlian term the Erlebnis should not be translated into the experience, however Carnapian Elementarerlebnis was a weird constructed term and perhaps for its strangeness was changed by the more accurate the elementary experience. I use that last one in my interpretation (referring usually to the visual perception) and in the same time I prefer to avoid Husserlian Erlebnisstrom used also by Carnapa (translated as the stream of experience).          
75 Certainly The Logical Building of the World must not be conceived as other traditional works of philosophers. For it is an encyclopedic-synthetic work (enriched analytically with the researches mentioned above, of course)  and it is not a result of the individual investigations of the thinker. Hence we should be conscious either of the programmed eclectics or mainly the meta-theoretic character of the Aufbau: all the gathered herein results of researches of different disciplines are ordered in the course of constructing of the ‘system of science’ and reconstructing of the structure of our sensual (here: visual mainly) experience. At the bottom of the construction there lies a special conception of science and scientific language (within them there is situated such and such vision of philosophy and epistemology).
76 It is fragmentary, delimited (we cannot grasp, so to speak, the whole space) and subjective. Husserlian attitude hence is realistic and Carnapian anti-realistic.
77 In the sense Carnap’s conception from the Aufbau differs to that of the Raum and refers to that of the Chaos.
78 Cf. Grünbaum, (1973, p. 175), referring to Russell’s geometric conception from his The Principles of Mathematics posing identifying the geometric space with the physical one. 
79 In the sense we can speak of Carnapian logical conctructionism. 
80 The mutual relation between logic and physics is not clear in Carnap’s early thought. 
81 Carnap, Aufbau § 124. 
82 Carnap, Aufbau § 124. Reichenbach maintains explicitly that the space does not exist (1958, p. 86).
83 Carnap, Aufbau § 125.
84 Cf. Seibt, Constitution…, p. 171 ff., Mormann, A Quasianalytical Constitution of Physical Space, <hypatia.ss.uci.edu/LPS/psa2k/quasianalytic-space.pdf>, and Coffa, (1991, p. 217).
85 Seibt, (2000, p. 170 ff).
86 I am not sure whether the Aufbau constructions can be understood as performed on the ground of the natural science or monosubjective experience, for Carnap says about the Welt (even the Welt der Wissenschaft, (Aufbau-1, p. 200), and not only about the Wirklichkeit (ibid, p. 92) (as he did in the Chaos). However he says also about the Wirklichkeit in sense of the Aussenwelt (ibid, p. 131) The terms Aufbau or logische Aufbau are not technical one in the constitution theory, they become technical in the ‘structuralisticly’ translated Aufbau-2.  
87 Aufbau § 62.
88 ibid.
89 Cf. Seibt, (2000, pp.163-165).
90 Carnap says about die räumlische Ordnung der physichen Wirklichkeit (Aufbau-1, p. 129). 
91 Aufbau §11-12. However Carnap takes the concept of structure from Russell (ibid p. 23) he refers also to Husserlian and Meinogian theories (ibid §3). 
92 The ‘sensations’ are the objects domain of psychology whereas the ‘qualities’ – of phenomenology and Meinogian theory of object, Aufbau § 93-94. Moreover ‘sensations’ are constructed from the ‘qualities’.
93 We can point to the third ontological reduction i.e. identifying an object with a concept, Seibt, (2000, p. 163).  
94 Aufbau § 33, 45.
95 This assumption we could name ‘apriori-realistic’. Under some conditions I believe there is possible to interpret the ‘construction system’ realisticly. 
96 ibid § 66.
97 For the sake of simplicity let us assume the physical only (ibid §57), despite Carnap includes to the domain of scientific objects also ‘psychic’, ‘cultural’, ‘mathematic’ or ‘sensuous-phenomenological’ (sic!) (ibid § 31).  
98 Aufbau § 47.
99 This concept is also in Husserl works.
100 Carnap, Aufbau §49.
101 We do not know if Carnap refers here to Husserl’s eidetics or if it is his own conception. Perhaps he attempts to construct ‘at once’ either ‘the world of science’ or ‘the world of our experience’, Cf. Jeffrey in: (Erkenntnis (1991): 257).
102 Aufbau § 80.
103 It seems that under such conditions we can understand the procedures either that of visual-reductional or visual-constructional. When interpreting anti-realisticly we gain either Weylian model of the ‘ideal observer’ or as Moulines says the AI model, namely that where we program a robot to start seeing Cf. Moulines in: (Erkenntnis (1991) 75). 
104 Perhaps it would be enough to say: ‘topological’.
105 Aufbau § 93. As we know the idea of reducing of a certain object domain was not Husserl’s discovery but he elaborated a new form of reduction. Other reductions were performed e.g. by Helmholtz, Mach, neokantians and Russell. I would like to say that the proper ‘ontological reduction’ can be well-founded if it is conducted (can be conduced) within one and the same object order. Whereas within two (or more) object orders it is subject to the ‘ontological mistake’. We are allowed to reduce e.g. geometric objects to sets of points, physical objects to macro- or micro-objects and (under certain conditions) visual perceptions to visual sensations. Instead we are not allowed to reduce e.g. the mental states to physical ones, for we do not have good reasons to prove the existence of objective interconnection between those two spheres.     
106 About that Carnap deals with the essential relations in the course of his descriptions of the structure and contents of our experience we can infer from that 1) he explicitly emphasizes that ‘sensations’ are subject to psychology and ‘qualities’ (here in the objectivistic and essential meaning) are subject to the phenomenology and theory of object (in Meinong’s sense) (Aufbau §93-94) and 2) the special two-fold notation introduced by Carnap to distinguish the objects in the sense of psychology and in the sense of the ‘constitution theory’.
107 Aufbau-1, p. 88, Aufbau-2, p. 104.
108 ibid §65.
109 Aufbau-1, p. 87 ff., Aufbau-2, p. 103 ff. 
110 Certainly, if we thought deeply enough in the formulation we would not agree with Carnap (and other similar positions), for if we really wanted to speak only of the ‘conditions of possibility of any seeing’ it would make no sense to describe them without any assumption to a seeing subject. 
111 As it was in Husserl’s ‘visual isolation’.
112 Perhaps he refers to Helmholtz conception here.
113 They are behind us ‘now’, ‘eventually’.
114 Husserl says about  the ‘visual points’ (1973, pp. 164-166, 260).
115 Carnap, Aufbau § 68-69. 
116 Aufbau-1, p. 104, Aufbau-2, p. 121. The Quasi-analysis formulated for the first time in the Quasi-Zerlegung…, was modified: 1) simplified in the Aufbau and 2) over-formulated by Goodman in his Structure of Appearance. Cf. Seibt (1997, p. 312 ff.).
117 The conception of the ‘color points’ is in Hume’s and Berkeley’s thoughts. Cf. Wittgenstein (1961, 6.3751).
118 Carnap, Aufbau § 125.
119 Carnap, Aufbau § 126.
120 Carnap, Aufbau § 126.
121 Carnap refers to the phenomenology of perception as one of primary sciences for his ‘science system’ (Cf. Aufbau-1, p. 148,  Aufbau-2,  p.176).
122 ibid § 127. Analogically as in Husserl’s conception of the ‘visual isolation’.
123 ibid § 127, point 12.
124 ibid §128.
125 ibid § 130-133. Cf. note 16 in this paper.
126 ibid § 129.
127 Analogically as in Husserl’s.
128 ibid § 132.
129 ibid § 106 .
130 ibid § 135.
131 This conception occurs already in the Raum.
132 In the first meaning: the (movable) world-point e.g. ‘blue’ (having such and such space-time location: here, now) would be a formal image of the blue color seen by me on my shirt at a given moment. I do not have to add that if it were not to be an epistemological construct as a ‘sense-data’ we should locate it inside of the mental sphere of a subject and then it would be something like a Husserlian ‘intentional object’. In the second meaning, i.e. if the ‘blue-world-point’ represented all ‘perceptual cases of the color blue’ in our sensual experience, we would have to treat it as if in the model theory (e.g. as a mere construct of a color theory), ontologically (as the essence of blue) or again intentionally in a stronger than in the first time (as ‘my private essence’ of blue). Perhaps we should interpret the ‘world-points’ ontologically in a different way than above. We could take a ‘red-world-point’ as being assigned to the roof of the house of my neighbors and as picturing a certain still physical qualification that occurs every time when perceiving the house. We do not see it continually but whenever we look at it its roof is red. Assigning every time the ‘red-world-point’ to a given physical object we synthesize processes of many analogical perceptions and the synthesis occurs in the so-called ‘recollection of similarity’. The recollection is meant by Carnap as a fundamental logical relation in the reconstructed structure of our sensual experience. However, from the topological point of view the above mentioned description is not an accurate one. Carnap should have rather used a concept of the area (i.e. open set) as a primary to the concept of the point. Using that would be easier to him to describe the spatial relations within the visual perception. And then the formalization of such comprehended contents of perception would hale to be different than that of the Aufbau, assuming of course, that the intra-perceptive dependencies are to be so easily logisticly interpreted.
133 Aufbau § 136. 
134 Richardson claims that here lies the weakest point of Carnap’s program from the Aufbau; the postulate of physico-qualitate correlation was also strongly criticized by Quine (private email). Cf. Seibt (1997, pp. 315, 317).
135 The space for Carnap is definitely the multidimensional continuum constructible on the ground of reciprocal assignments between (the respectively distributed) objects of the physical sphere and objects of the sphere of experiences of different subjects of cognition.
136 Cf. Creath, in: (Erkenntnis (1991): 373-374). 
137 ibid § 133. 
138 The author of the Cartesian Meditations uses a complicated and rich phenomenological lexicon whereas  Carnap uses logistical-physicalistic (or logistical-phenomenalistic) one.
139 Here he follows perhaps Riemann, Russell and Whitehead.
140 This introduced by Helmholtz notion is the first endeavor that ‘geometrizes’ our perception. It seems that assuming the perspective of the ‘two-dimensional field’ at once puts as before the problem of ‘reconstructing’ our seeing of space. The notion of field taken by Helmholtz from the XIX century physics (and „proved” with the experimental researches) had been probably introduced by Descartes (the ‘field of forces’), but it is highly non-demonstrative in order to describe our visual perception and first of all it is unjustified from the epistemological point of view. Even if we extremely reduced the kinetics of our perception we could not say that there spreads the ‘two-dimensional field’ before our eyes. We could agree about that notion if we assumed that it refers to that what is seen by us and not to our manner of seeing. I can assume that the wall in front of me (if it fills the range of my sight) forms the ‘two-dimensional field’ but anyway I can see it spatially for between the surface of the wall and me there spreads a certain ‘vision space’. The latter can ‘shorten’ itself, can be ‘flatter’ or ‘deeper’, but it is irreducible and is a fundamental phenomenon in a description of our outer perceiving.  
141 Cf. Carnap (1966, p. 168). It would be more accurately to say that the geometric model is suitable to the construction of the physical one.
142 There are many more weak points in both theories, e.g. 1) a problem of the constitution of the other subjects (methodological solipsism), 2) omitting the audible aspect of spatiality (sounds around inform us about locations and movements of things), 3) constitution of corporality (omitting such issues as a resistance, pain, gravity etc.), 4) concerning only few kinds of movements in perception.
143 The conceptions of the cognizability of space could be divided into four ones: space is cognizable 1) sensually, 2) intellectually (mentally, intuitively, imaginatively, noeticly etc.), 3) either sensually or intellectually; 4) space is uncognizable. Husserl’s position can be assigned to 3) while Carnap’s to 2), I guess because of his radical visual reduction i.e. the ‘blind-case’ and ‘subject-less’ anti-realistic pre-assumptions in the theory of space.    
144 It is not a natural cognition, for we usually do not attempt to perceive space. Our moving is always grounded upon our appraisal of locations and shapes of the objects surrounding us. This type of sight that I mean needs the intentional decentralization of that what is seen by us, hence it needs a new perceptual activity and certain training.
145 I mean decades after the Vienna Circle period.
146 J. Seibt says about four Carnap’s followers: Goodman, Quine, G. Bergmann and W. Sellars (1997, p. 305).
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